Sam Spound is a third-year history & political economy student at King’s College London. He is interested in Western political thought, great-power politics, and Roman history. Sam currently holds an offer for the MPhil in political thought and intellectual history at the University of Cambridge.
1: A U.S. Carrier Strike Group operates in formation in the South China (Feb 2010).
Strategic Ambiguity – the policy of deliberate uncertainty – has been a lynchpin of America’s posture in the Taiwan Strait since the Nixon administration moved to warm relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1970’s. It has largely allowed the U.S. to ensure the security of the Republic of China (ROC), better known as Taiwan, without making iron-clad commitments nor taking an overtly offensive stance in the eyes of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While strategic ambiguity has granted the U.S. relative autonomy and produced overall stability in cross-strait relations over the last half-century, some argue that the doctrine is obsolete. As China has conducted the largest peacetime armament in human history, some say that strategic ambiguity does not adequately address the contemporary geopolitical layout of the South-China Sea. The pros and cons of the policy, in today’s security landscape, will be weighed below, ultimately concluding that the policy need not be changed, yet.
Pros: Strategic ambiguity was founded upon the basis of The Taiwan Relations Act (1979) which does not give the ROC an explicit security guarantee, though it ensures for a sustained transfer of weapons to Taiwan. Since its enactment, the U.S. has overseen a precarious stability between mainland China and Taiwan, with some notably tense periods, such as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of the mid-90’s. The policy of strategic ambiguity has, thus far, enabled the U.S. to avoid any form of “entanglement” in the China-Taiwan dispute, defined by Beckley as “when a state is dragged into a military conflict… by moral, legal, or reputational concerns to uphold an alliance commitment… often at the expense of, its national interests.” Importantly, the doctrine of strategic ambiguity allows for the cultural nuances of the China-Taiwan dynamic. The PRC sees the ROC as a runaway province and pursues two ends in its Taiwan policy: prevention of a declaration of independence and facilitation of complete reunification. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses the Taiwan issue as a diversionary and nationalistic tool; the dispute is of strong emotional significance to the Chinese populous, to paraphrase Allison. As Huntington highlighted the centrality of culture in post-Cold War conflict, strategic ambiguity effectively accommodates the cultural vicissitudes of the China-Taiwan situation by refraining from any rhetorical proclamations. Importantly, the doctrine of strategic ambiguity abstains from any formal recognition of Taiwan as a state and does not encourage Taiwanese independence. While it accounts for mainland China’s cultural conditions, it still hints at an active role played by the U.S. in ensuring Taiwanese national security. In short, the doctrine has historically proven itself effective by balancing interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Strategic ambiguity also grants the U.S. leverage over rogue Taiwanese signalling. Contrary to conclusions found by Yeh and Wu, strategic ambiguity has not emboldened the Taiwanese to act belligerently. Yeh and Wu cite the 2016 election of Democratic-Progressive Party Candidate Tsai Ing-Wen, whose party rejects the 1992 ‘One-China’ consensus reached by China and Taiwan, as evidence of Taiwanese belligerence enabled by America’s strategic ambiguity. Weng, however, is not overtly pro-independence, as she’s advocated against a formal declaration in favour of preserving the status quo, where Taiwan is effectively independent. Taiwanese publics agree; “a June 2022 survey found that only 5.2% of Taiwanese supported independence as soon as possible, while 1.3% were in favour of unification with mainland China at the earliest possibility”, according to the BBC. This restrained sentiment among the Taiwanese can be attributed, in part, to the nonconformity of strategic ambiguity: Washington would likely exercise its option to abstain from any conflict triggered by a declaration of independence from Taipei. Such leverage, exemplified by President Bush’s 2003 reprimanding of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s flagrant language, demonstrates a key merit of strategic ambiguity: it avoids entanglement and allows the U.S. to regulate rogue Taiwanese behaviour, thereby defusing the situation.
Cons: Despite the merits listed above, some argue that the policy of strategic ambiguity has been outgrown by both the PRC and USA. Last month, in blatant disregard of American deterrence, President Xi promised his people Taiwanese reunification by 2049: the hundred year anniversary of Mao’s communist victory and expulsion of the nationalists. On the American side, President Biden has signalled hawkish positions, even responding “yes” when asked if American forces would personally defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion (his administration minimized the statement later). Throughout his term, he has otherwise shown unprecedented support by inviting the Taiwanese representative to his inauguration and by maintaining consistently close relations with Taiwanese officials. Biden has also built on Trump’s policy of establishing trade agreements with Taiwan with a path toward a formal free-trade agreement in the future. Should the U.S. and Taiwan reach an FTA, the ROC would be treated geopolitically and economically as an independent state by the U.S. in all but name. These recent developments reflect a move away from the status quo and an escalation in signalling, thus, boding poorly for the doctrine’s contemporary applicability.
In recent years, key voices in the U.S. Foreign Policy Community have also endorsed a frank stance in cross strait relations, arguing that the doctrine of strategic ambiguity is obsolete and must be replaced with another strategy that accounts for China’s drastic increase in capability. China’s armament has fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the region; while the PRC’s navy is not nearly as powerful as that of America’s, it has been designed, for decades, with a Taiwanese invasion in mind. Its armada of short-range boats are built for close combat, and some have even suggested that the Chinese navy could overtake the island before an adequate U.S. deployment made it across the Pacific. In deterrence theory, an effective deterrent can only be established if it is perceived to be backed by credibility, will, and capability. As China has received only slaps on the wrist for its repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and aggression in the South China Sea, a policy that is decidedly ambiguous may not present any deterrence for a markedly important issue. China’s irredentist behaviour, in addition to bipartisan war-weariness and isolationism in Washington, validates Richard Haas’ claim that “faltering American credibility feeds the potential for a dangerous Chinese miscalculation” (i.e., invasion). In a 2021 article for Foreign Affairs, the long-time president of the Council on Foreign Relations advocated for a forward policy of “strategic clarity” that communicates an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan and harsh consequences for Chinese aggression while declining to endorse a Taiwanese declaration of independence. Haas proposed this policy through the increased transfer of U.S. military assets to Guam and Japan while employing strong language regarding Taiwanese commitments.
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute, another important U.S. foreign policy voice, also argued that American deterrence, a mere 90 miles off the Chinese coast, has already been lost. He instead weighed a holistic deterrent, backed by strategic clarity, in various spheres of American dominance, including the global economy. China is dependent on the international community for roughly three quarters of its energy. By volume, the PRC is the most dependant country on imports and exports in the world; this includes roughly 80% of materials which allow them to grow their own food (i.e., fertiliser, corn, wheat, soy, etc). China’s fundamental dependence on the American-led international trade order produces an extreme vulnerability to any blockade in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and/or cordon of international sanctions, to the effect of an “industrial collapse in a matter of months” and mass famine among its population of 1.4 billion “in a matter of years”, according to geopolitical consultant Peter Zeihan. This economic vulnerability, hinted at by Haas and O’Hanlon, might not necessitate itself to be highlighted in a strategically clear fashion to establish deterrence in Beijing. The Politburo has, doubtless, noted this glaring dependence on international trade; they already know the U.S. would impose devastating economic consequences in the event of a Taiwanese invasion as America’s global navy oversees the international trade waterways upon which China is enormously dependant. Further, China resides in a hostile neighbourhood in which American defence-partners like Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and the Philippines would contribute in any hot conflict or in the enforcement of a Chinese naval blockade. This exposure to commercial warfare is already factored into the Chinese calculous, presenting a massive deterrent element to the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Hence, a move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity might be redundant in its benefits and inflammatory in its detriments, as the Chinese already account for many perceived costs of an America-led response.
Of course, there is not an objectively right or wrong answer regarding whether strategic ambiguity ought to be scrapped or not. The consequences of leaving the potentially obsolete policy in place, or enflaming the situation with a policy change, are myriad and unforeseen. While, historically, strategic ambiguity has been an effective deterrent, the modern geopolitical landscape has changed, as China has pursued regional hegemony. Even still, China must recognize that there are many vulnerabilities and drawbacks to a Taiwanese invasion; the U.S. need not escalate, rhetorically, by highlighting China’s strategic weaknesses, about which Beijing is certainly aware already. Despite the ever-changing international landscape, one might conclude that the doctrine of strategic ambiguity might remain effective… for now.
International Relations Today 
