Tag Archives: authoritarianism

Venezuela and Democratic Authoritarianism


By Victoria Noya, a Venezuelan 3rd year International Development student, currently studying abroad in East Asia.

On December 2015 many Venezuelans gained new hope and optimism for their country, as the Opposition party secured three fifths of seats at the National Assembly, the legislative branch of Venezuela’s government. This was arguably a democratic victory that countered the government’s long standing authoritarian behaviour. However, as many expected, that optimism was short-lived. The Supreme Court, which abides by every whim and fancy of the central government, would go on to prohibit the legislature from naming a handful of members of the electoral council. Nevertheless, since the Venezuelan government has been playing a hybrid regime of authoritarian action with democratic facade and discourse, it came as a huge surprise when on March 29th, under the pretence of the National Assembly’s “contempt”, the Supreme Court decided to usurp the National Assembly[1], ruling that all the National Assembly’s powers would go to the Supreme Court. This has been interpreted by many as a “self-inflicted coup d’état”[2], since what was once a political body that kept the authoritarian regime in check, would no longer continue to do so.

For about 15 years Venezuelans have been living under a de facto dictatorship. At least in the sense that all democratic activity is in some way either restricted or influenced by the government. For example, freedom of speech, a right that goes hand in hand with democracy. Although the government has never spoken against it, it just so happened that throughout the past 15 years, news agencies that are anti-Chavez have been bought up one by one, by entities with Chavista agendas. This type of corruption seeps into essentially every industry that Venezuela has left. Additionally, it is the vox populi that elections are rigged. The subtlety of the government’s totalitarianism was key to establishing Venezuela’s government as a hybrid regime, and it allowed the president and his party to legitimately remain in power. March 29th wouldn’t be the first time the Supreme Court had abused its power, but it would be the first time that their grasp for power was so blunt.

Since March 29th, many peaceful protests led by the opposition have  turned violent, an occurrence that for the past couple of years, is no longer unusual. The blunt decision sparked outrage, since Venezuelans have never actively, perhaps not even knowingly, supported the government’s authoritarianism. This is why the interpretation of “self-inflicted coup d’etat” isn’t quite accurate, it’s more like the government was being honest about what they are: an authoritarian dictatorship. Whether it be because of international or internal pressure, President Maduro later urged the Supreme Court to reverse their decision[3], which only means that the government is back to being dishonest, and that nothing is going to change in the future.

Before I go on, it is important to expand where Venezuela finds itself now. With the progression of Chavez’s presidency, so grew a new political ideology: Chavismo. This populist anti-US ideology gained much popularity among the lower classes, who were told that the government would support them and that their hardships were at the hand of the upper classes as well as US “imperialism”. This repeated discourse over more than 15 years created a social divide that had never existed before. The divide is exemplified in political elections, where Chavistas are extremely loyal to Chavez and his legacy, and society is divided by an intense hostility between die-hard Chavistas and Opposition followers. After Chavez’s death, his legacy remained. The government has targeted the passionate loyalty of Chavistas to ensure power, which means that even under Maduro, a widely unpopular president, Chavistas are unlikely to turn to the Opposition. Insanely high crime rates add to the heightened tensions and fear that has become part of Venezuelan’s daily life, to the point that all new cars being bought are bulletproof – that is, if there even are cars to sell and enough money to buy them, given that inflation is at 800%[4]. Venezuela’s chaotic wasteland of an economy depends on oil exports. The 2014 drop in oil prices had a drastic effect on the economy, but only because decades of high oil revenue with mass deprivatization and virtually no investment in industry or infrastructure, meant the country was not equipped to deal with a sudden drop in government revenue. Today, shortages and scarcity has become the norm in Venezuela: there is no food and no medicine, and prolonged water and electricity cuts are more likely than not. Protests are a regular occurrence, most often for food and medicine shortages, and most recently expressing their disappointment at the Supreme Court.

Given the state of Venezuela today, it is easy to see why the Supreme Court chose to solidify the government’s power. The government likely felt they were losing their grasp on the country due to the economic and social turmoil it faces. That being said, I fear that President Maduro’s demand that the Supreme Court reverse its decision means that any change in the social or political sphere of the country is very unlikely. Firstly, the Venezuelan people may interpret the National Assembly’s regained control as a victory, even though it is not. While the National Assembly was and is able to keep the central government in check to some extent, the Supreme Court and central government have always had more power and could play the National Assembly like a chessboard. Secondly, since it was President Maduro who publicly stated his disapproval of the Supreme Court’s actions, the “blame” is shifted from the central government to the Supreme Court, thus shedding the government in a false democratic light, and solidifying its popularity among voters. Furthermore, banning the leader of the Opposition[5], Henrique Capriles, from candidacy in the upcoming 2018 elections is the same behaviour displayed by the central government since the Opposition began gaining recognition, long before Chavez’s passing. It is with a heavy heart that I give a pessimistic prediction of Venezuela’s future, regardless of any external factor, the core problem is the central government’s reluctance to give up power no matter the cost to society.


[1] The Economist, Venezuela leaps towards dictatorship, March 2017

[2] Luis Almagro, secretary-general of OAS, The Economist March 2017

[3] The Economist, The Venezuelan Government’s Abortive Power Grab, April 2017

[4] Reuters, CNBC, Venezuela 2016 inflation hits 800 percent, GDP shrinks 19 percent: Document, Jan 2017

[5] Ulmer and Ellsworth, Leading Venezuela Opposition figure barred from office 15 years, April 2017


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Professor Putin: the Kremlin Tries its Hand at Teaching History, with Ominous Results

by Lincoln Pigman, a first year student of War Studies at King’s College London currently involved with a Russian NGO called Memorial.

Between Stalin’s purges, two world wars, and the collapse of communism, the past century has not been kind to Russia. To many observers, its recent incursions into Ukraine and Georgia seem reckless, threatening to add to a long list of catastrophes. Yet despite economic crisis and international isolation, President Vladimir Putin remains popular with Russians, capitalizing on a legacy of tragedy to justify not only aggressive foreign policy but also authoritarian governance.
That history would figure heavily into any Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a given; after all, since the mid-17th century, Ukraine has spent the better part of its history either as part of or directly subordinated to Russia. During the annexation of the Crimea, the Kremlin claimed to be defending Russian citizens threatened by the new Ukrainian government. Since then, however, it has redefined the peninsula’s union with Russia, now a corrective measure taken in light of the “illegal” nature of the 1954 transfer of Crimea, according to Russia’s Prosecutor General. [1] The Russian government’s tacit obligation to correct the errors of its Soviet predecessor reveals continuity of policy, as does its portrayal of the Ukrainian government. Russian analysts and politicians contend that followers of the late Stepan Bandera – Ukrainian nationalist and perennial foe of the Soviets – dominate Poroshenko’s government, drawing the ire of Russians who still despise Bandera for his collaboration with Nazis in the Great Patriotic War. [2] Likewise, Putin exploits long-standing fear of NATO encroachment by holding the military organization accountable for all that has transpired since the Euromaidan protests of last year: chaos in Kiev, war in Donbas, and the international community’s resurgent vilification of Russia. [3] By perpetuating conflicts of old – between a harmless Russia, a nationalistic Ukraine, and an expansionist NATO – Putin generates popular support for and consent to continued military involvement in Ukraine, further undermining Russia’s international standing.

To Putin’s supporters, fighting Bandera’s neo-Nazi ilk and resisting NATO’s eastward expansion are worthwhile causes. On the home front, a separate war fought by propagandists and jingoists rages on against dissent. The Kremlin’s case against political opposition also draws heavily from history, most notably from the First World War, in which Russia, embroiled in civil war, sued for peace. On the war’s centenary, Putin disingenuously blamed the events of 1918 on “national betrayal” by “those who sowed dissension [and] longed for power”, an attack on Lenin’s Bolsheviks that brings to mind the stab-in-the-back myth promulgated in interwar Germany. [4] Behind the rhetoric, Putin’s argument targets opposition leaders like Alexei Navalny, whose dissent has made him the President’s – and his supporters’ – greatest enemy. Although his brother currently sits behind bars, a hostage of the government, serving a prison term for alleged embezzlement, Navalny plans to continue his political campaign against Putin and his cronies. To Navalny’s supporters, his commitment reflects perseverance and courage; but to his opponents, it confirms Putin’s argument: that Navalny is an agent of betrayal, set to bring about a comparable defeat through dissent and unchecked ambition. Few protest Navalny’s exclusion from local elections.
The marginalization of Navalny and his Party of Progress epitomizes a greater development in Russian politics: Putin’s embrace of authoritarianism, reinforced by the Kremlin’s historical narrative. In Russian textbooks, efficient administration defines Stalin’s rule, completely sanitized save the occasional claim that his purges stabilized Russia. [5] Putin’s students must think repressive measures today would, too. Recent surveys by Levada Center highlight three attitudes widespread in Russia: that a return to Soviet-style repression is imminent [6]; that Stalin bettered the country [7]; and that a Stalin-like leader in Russia would enjoy significant support today. [8] Putin has taught his subjects well. Only time will tell whether history, as the saying goes, truly repeats itself.
[1] “1954 Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine Illegal – Russian Prosecutor General,” Sputnik, accessed 8 October 2015, http://sputniknews.com/russia/20150627/1023916532.html

[2] Raisa Ostapenko, “The Success of Russia’s Propaganda: Ukraine’s ‘Banderovtsy’,” Cambridge Globalist, accessed 8 October 2015, http://cambridgeglobalist.org/2015/01/29/success-russias-propaganda-ukraines-banderovtsy/

[3] Bryan MacDonald, “Do you realize what you have done? – Putin gives the war party a bootin’,” RT, accessed 8 October 2015, https://www.rt.com/op-edge/316884-ukraine-syria-putin-unga/

[4] Peter Rutland, “By Glorifying WWI, Putin Ignores Its Tragedy”, The Moscow Times, accessed 8 October 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/by-glorifying-wwi-putin-ignores-its-tragedy/504549.html

[5] Cathy Young, “Stalin’s Ghost”, Forbes, accessed 8 October 2015, http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/16/russia-joseph-stalin-victory-day-opinions-contributors-cathy-young.html

[6] Thomas de Waal, ed., Maria Lipman, Lev Gudkov, Lasha Bakradze, The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment, 2013)

[7] Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Failing the Stalin Test”, Foreign Affairs, accessed 8 October 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2006-01-01/failing-stalin-test

[8] Ibid

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